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LABOR LAW
OVERVIEW
The field of labor law produced a significant number of
Tenth Circuit decisions in the past year. Due to the breadth and
variety of the individual fact situations covered, the cases in this
overview are grouped according to the particular statute which
formed the basis of decision. The two most significant decisions
of the Tenth Circuit in the last year, Chief Freight Lines Co. v.
Teamsters Local 886,' and NLRB v. R. L. Sweet Lumber Co.,I are
the subjects of the case comments which follow this overview.
I.

LABOR MANAGEMENT RELATIONS ACT-NATIONAL LABOR
RELATIONS ACT3

A.

Unfair Labor PracticesBy Employers

A large number of unfair labor practice cases seeking injunctive relief and enforcement of National Labor Relations Board
orders issued pursuant to section 10(e)' were decided in the past
year.
1. Refusal to Bargain'
The Tenth Circuit issued a mandate to enforce a NLRB
award requiring the employer to bargain with the union in NLRB
v. King Radio Corp.' After the union had filed an unfair labor
practice charge, the employer claimed an impasse in negotiations, and, because of an increase in unit size and employee turnover, questioned the union's majority status. Although more than
1 year had in fact passed since the union's certification and no
contract had been successfully negotiated during that time, the
presumption of continued representative status could be rebutted
only by the employer's demonstration of a good faith, reasonable
doubt as to the majority status.' Employee turnover alone was
insufficient for such a showing! Because the factors relied on by
2

3

7

514 F.2d 572 (10th Cir. 1975).
515 F.2d 785 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 96 S. Ct. 393 (1975).
29 U.S.C. §§ 141-44, 151-67, 171-83, 185-87, 191-97, 557 (1970).
Id. § 160(e).
Id. §§ 158(a)(1), (5).
510 F.2d 1154 (10th Cir. 1975).
Id. at 1156, citing NLRB v. Frick Co., 423 F.2d 1327, 1330-31 (3d Cir. 1970).
510 F.2d at 1156, citing NLRB v. Little Rock Downtowner, Inc., 414 F.2d 1084, 1091
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the employer had existed for some time prior to his claim, the
Board was upheld in finding that the claim was spurious, since
no evidence had been shown as to employee opposition to the
union.'
The NLRB's determinaion that no impasse had in fact occurred was also upheld by the court of appeals. As agreement on
many issues had been reached at the last negotiation meeting,
such findings were held to be "peculiarly within Board expertise" 10 and were sustained because they were supported by the
record. The court, however, rejected the NLRB's argument that
failure to pay a prior backpay award precludes an employer from
questioning the majority status of the union."
In Jason/Empire Inc. v. NLRB12 the court upheld the
NLRB's discretion in refusing to consider the employer's contention that an election was invalid as justification for its refusal to
bargain. This contention was found to be untimely, although the
court in dicta stated that it did not "accept as an absolute the
contention that objections to the validity of an election must be
made within five days after such election."' 3
The employer in NLRB v. Glenn Spooner'4 refused to bargain
with a union recognized by the company's prior owner. Although
the fact of prior recognition was unknown to the successor e m*ployer, the Board found no adequate basis for a reasonable doubt
as to majority status, and the finding that the evidence as to
doubt was "flimsy" was upheld by the Tenth Circuit. This evidence consisted of: (1) A statement by one employee that there
were employees who did not want the union; (2) the fact that only
three of the employees on a prior related picket line were still
employees at the time of sale; and (3) a refusal by the union to
show signed authorization cards to the defendant. The court held
that substantially more evidence than that shown is required to
form the basis of a good faith doubt of majority status."5
(8th Cir. 1969).
510 F.2d at 1157.
Id., citing NLRB v. J.H. Bonck Co., 424 F.2d 634, 638 (5th Cir. 1970).
510 F.2d at 1157.
1 518 F.2d 7 (10th Cir. 1975).
13 Id. at 8.
No. 74-1222 (10th Cir., Jan. 14, 1975) (Not for Routine Publication).
Id. In determining the exact date of the refusal to bargain, the court held that the
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2.

Discharge of Employees"

In NLRB v. Oklahoma Allied Telephone Co. 7 an employee
was discharged for concerted union activities protected by section
7 of the Act. The employee's complaints and his walking off the
job were in response to poor working conditions, such as excessive
heat due to an inoperative air conditioning system and paint
fumes. The court stated that "activity by an individual may be
concerted if it is intended for the mutual aid and protection of
all employees"; 8 however, it ruled that mere complaints about
conditions of employment are not protected per se by section 7.
The fact that any relief obtained in response to complaints might
benefit others is not controlling if the individual is in fact speaking solely as an individual, rather than on behalf of other employ9
ees.
Two NLRB cases were combined in NLRB v. Dayton Tire &
Rubber Co. 0 In the first' the Board found that the employees'
discharges were the result of testimony they gave on behalf of the
NLRB's general counsel at a previous Board hearing. In contrast,
the reasons given by the employer for the discharges, which
ranged from stealing to absenteeism, were found to be frivolous
and mere pretext in light of the generally good work records and
substantial union activity of the discharged employees. The employees were ordered reinstated without penalty. 2
In the second case2 3 an employee, active in union
organization, was discharged shortly after he was seen distributing union authorization cards. His discharge was found to be an
unfair labor practice. As the employer's no-solicitation rule had
never been previously invoked, its application in this instance
was found to be discriminatory and motivated by a desire to
test to be applied is the manifestation or indication of an intent not to negotiate. Such
intent was manifested when the defendant demanded a view of the union authorization
cards as proof of majority status, when it had no good faith doubt as to that status.
" 29 U.S.C. § 157 (1970).
'7 No. 74-1461 (10th Cir., May 2, 1975) (Not for Routine Publication).
I
Id.
I
Id.
"

503
No.
503
No.

F.2d 759 (10th Cir. 1974).
74-1019.
F.2d at 762.
74-1020.
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discourage union activity.24 The court agreed with the NLRB's
argument that the mere existence of a proper ground for discharge
is not controlling as to the validity of the discharge when the
actual motivation is determined to be the employee's union activ25
ity.
In NLRB v. Dolese Co.26 the court ordered enforcement of the
Board's decree that an employee who had been involved in initial
union organization efforts was discharged for protected union activity. The employee was fired 2 weeks after the employees as a
group voted in favor of union representation. The Tenth Circuit
found substantial evidence in the record to support the NLRB's
findings that the employer did in fact know of the employee's
union activity and that such knowledge was the motivation for his
discharge.
2 7
3. Interference with Union Activities
The evidence in Dayton Tire & Rubber28 was also held to
support findings of unlawful interference with protected union
activity. The first of the two cases considered 9 involved instances
of coercive interrogation of employees by supervisors as to the
employees' support of the union. 31 In the second case 3' there was
evidence of harassment of employees carrying union authorization cards and the firing of employees with the purpose and intent
to discourage union activity. 32 In both cases, statements were
made by supervisors which indicated that the employees' union
activities were under management surveillance, which interfered
with the employees' section 7 rights. 33 In Dolese34 the court accepted the NLRB's conclusions that the employer had interfered
with protected union activity. There was evidence of interrogations of employees, offers of pay increases, prohibitions of litera503 F.2d at 762.
11Id. at 762, citing S.A. Healy Co. v. NLRB, 435 F.2d 314 (10th Cir. 1970); Betts
Baking Co. v. NLRB, 380 F.2d 199 (10th Cir. 1967).
24 No. 74-1512 (10th Cir., May 29, 1975) (Not for Routine Publication).
27 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(1) (1970).
- 503 F.2d 759 (10th Cir. 1974).
No. 74-1019.
503 F.2d at 761.
No. 74-1020.
2 503 F.2d at 763.
Id. at 761, 762.
No. 74-1512 (10th Cir., May 29, 1975) (Not for Routine Publication).
24
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ture dissemination, unprecedented solicitation of employee grievances, and an employee discharge; all were intended to discourage union activity. 5
6
B. Unfair Labor Practices by Union
In Sperandeo v. Carpet Layers Local 41937 the court of appeals upheld the trial court's denial of the NLRB's request for
injunctive relief pursuant to section 10(1) of the Act.3 A carpeting
company ceased installing its own carpets under the existing
collective bargaining agreement with the defendant, and began to
subcontract all installation work to other firms, some of which
employed non-union labor at substandard wages. The union picketed both the original employer and the subcontractors in protest,
and some employees refused to cross the picket line. The employer, interpreting the picketing as an attempt to coerce it to
cease doing business with non-union subcontractors, filed an unfair labor practice charge. 9 A settlement was reached, but subsequent picketing at the store of the original employer resulted in
another such charge based on a claim of secondary boycott
activity. 0 The regional director then petitioned for injunctive relief pursuant to section 10(1).11
In order to grant an injunction, the trial court had to find
cause to believe an unfair labor practice occurred or was occurring
and that the requested injunction was just and proper.2 Determining that the employer in this case was not neutral and would
suffer no loss or damage by the strike, the trial court denied the
requested injunction. 3 Although there was some question as to
the standards for review of the denial of an injunction, the court
of appeals concluded that either the grant or the denial of the
requested injunction should be reviewed under the same stanmId.
29 U.S.C. § 158(b) (1970).
11No. 75-1135 (10th Cir., June 18, 1975) (Not for Routine Publication).
29 U.S.C. § 160(1) (1970).
"' Id. § 158(b)(4)(B).
40 Id. § 158(b)(4)(i)(ii)(B).
1 Id. § 160(1).
12 Id.
3 Sperandeo v. Carpet Layers Local 419, No. 75-1135 (10th Cir., June 18, 1975) (Not
for Routine Publication).
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dard-abuse of discretion." Since no abuse of discretion was
found, the judgment of the trial court was affirmed.
C.

Injunctions

A mandatory injunction ordering arbitration was entered
pursuant to section 301(a)45 in Carpenters District Council v.
Brady Corp.4" The collective bargaining agreement in Brady
Corp. provided for arbitration of all but "jurisdictional disputes."4 A grievance arose because the corporation assigned to a
non-union employee work which was to be covered by the agreement unless "claimed" by another union or trade. While holding
that courts rather than arbitrators determine issues of "substantive arbitrability,"45 the Tenth Circuit followed the rule that
where an exclusion-from-arbitration clause is vague, and the arbitration clause is broad, only the most forceful evidence of a purpose
to exclude the claim from arbitration will deter a court from directing the dispute to arbitration.49

The court found that the dispute in question was not a jurisdictional dispute, but was in fact a dispute as to interpretation of
the word "claimed" in the collective bargaining agreement. Thus,
the trial court was upheld in its finding that the dispute was
within the scope of the agreement's arbitration clause. 0
In C. F. & I. Steel Corp. v. UMW' the union appealed the
granting of a section 301 injunction forbidding it from
engaging in a strike, work stoppage, interruption of work, or picketing. . . over disputes arising from employee suspensions, employee
discharges, and work assignments, during the remaining life of the
National Bituminous Coal Wage Agreement of 1971.52

After reviewing the evidence heard by the trial court, the Tenth
IId.

29 U.S.C. § 185(a) (1970).

513 F.2d 1 (loth Cir. 1975).
" Id. at 2.

Id. at 3, citing Johnson Builders, Inc. v. Carpenters Local No. 1095, 422 F.2d 137
(10th Cir. 1970); UAW v. Folding Carrier Corp., 422 F.2d 47 (loth Cir. 1970).
1 513 F.2d at 3, citing United Steelworkers v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363
U.S. 574 (1970), Locomotive Firemen Local 844 v. Kennecott Copper Corp., 388 F.2d 224
(10th Cir. 1964), and UAW v. Cardwell Mfg. Co., 304 F.2d 801 (10th Cir. 1962).
I'
Id. at 4.
51507 F.2d 170 (10th Cir. 1974).
52

Id. at 171.

LABOR LAW

1976

Circuit concluded that the injunction as granted was not impermissibly vague or overbroad. 3 In view of the number of union
violations of the collective bargaining agreement, the granting of
the injunction was affirmed.54
Trustees of Colorado Laborers Health & Welfare Fund v.
Ritchie55 involved the dissolution of a partnership and its subsequent takeover by one of the original partners as sole proprietor.
The new owner sent checks to the health and welfare fund after
acquiring the operation, but later terminated payments. The
union's claim for amounts due the fund under the collective bargaining agreement between the union and the partnership was
denied by the trial court. The court of appeals reversed, holding
that Ritchie's unilateral and subjective repudiation of the collective bargaining agreement was insufficient to relieve him of all
obligations thereunder. In reaching this result, the court mentioned Ritchie's continued membership in the Associated Building Contractors of Colorado which represented contractors, including Ritchie, in bargaining with the union. In support of its
findings the Tenth Circuit also noted the continuity of the busi5
ness and its dealings.
D.

Arbitration

In Retail Store Employees Local 782 v. Say-On Groceries"
the Tenth Circuit affirmed a district court's refusal to enforce an
arbitration award in favor of a union member. The employee
brought a grievance based on a reduction in her working hours,
because the hours of other workers with less seniority were not
similarly reduced. After finding that the employer had acted unfairly, the arbitrator granted backpay, and ordered the employer
not to assign work so as to reduce the complainant's hours or
eliminate her job. When the employer refused to pay the backpay
award and discharged the employee, the union sued.
The trial court accepted the company's argument that the
Id. at 173, citing International Longshoremen Local 1291 v. Marine Trade Ass'n,
389 U.S. 64 (1967).
Id. at 177. In reaching this conclusion, the Tenth Circuit particularly considered
Boys Markets, Inc. v. Retail Clerks Local 770, 398 U.S. 235 (1970). Id. at 173-76.
No. 74-1507 (10th Cir., Apr. 28, 1975) (Not for Routine Publication).

5 Id.

57508 F.2d 500 (10th Cir. 1975).
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arbitrator had no power to grant backpay, because the issue of
back wages had not been submitted to arbitration. The trial
court's finding that the arbitration award of back wages was null
and void was affirmed on appeal. 8 Appellant also challenged the
trial court's order submitting the issue of back wages to a separate
arbitrator, rather than remanding the issue to the original arbitrator for clarification. The Tenth Circuit found this contention
without merit, in light of its determination that the original arbitrator had no authority to award backpay. 5g
In a well-reasoned dissent, 0 Judge Doyle argued that the
issue of back wages, though not specifically submitted, was
within the authority of the original arbitrator. He noted that the
purpose of submission to arbitration was "not only to determine
the rightness or wrongness of the problem, but to achieve a monetary result."'" He stated that the collective bargaining agreement
appeared to contemplate the possibility of a backpay award, and
held that the issue was "whether the award of money damages
was within the contemplation of the submission."62 Judge Doyle
also argued that the issue should be remanded to the original
arbitrator, because he felt the basic philosophy of all arbitration
would be frustrated by ordering rearbitration of an issue previously decided by another arbitrator.63
II.

LABOR-MANAGEMENT REPORTING AND DISCLOSURE

ACT64

Only one decision based on this Act, United States v. Bath,6 5
was handed down in the last year by the Tenth Circuit. The
defendant, president of Teamsters Local 961, was convicted by a
jury of knowingly reporting payments of union money to hired
non-union pickets as "strike benefits" to union members," and
I Id. at 503, citing Luggage Workers Local 66 v. Neevel Luggage Mfg. Co., 325 F.2d
992 (8th Cir. 1964).
59Id.
Id. at 503-04.
" Id. at 504.
" Id., citing International Union of Electrical Workers v. Peerless Pressed Metal
Corp., 489 F.2d 768 (1st Cir. 1973), Kroger Co. v. Teamsters Local 661, 380 F.2d 728 (6th
Cir. 1967), Newark Wire Cloth Co. v. United Steelworkers, 339 F. Supp. 1207 (D.N.J.
1972), Electric Specialty Co. v. Electrical Workers Local 1069, 222 F. Supp. 314 (D. Conn.
1963).
6 Id. at 504.
29 U.S.C. §§ 401-531 (1970) [hereinafter cited as LMRDA].
504 F.2d 456 (10th Cir. 1974).
" In violation of 29 U.S.C. § 439(b) (1970).
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willfully making false entries in records required to verify and
clarify the local union's annual financial reports to the Secretary
of Labor. 7
The picket line at Centennial Turf Club was manned by
some 80 pickets, at least 31 of whom were not working at Centennial at the time, and for whom "out-of-work benefits" were
requested from the Teamsters International Office."' The court
upheld Bath's conviction, holding that his actions defeated the
purpose of the LMRDA, which is to insure that union officials
accurately report to union members the details of all disbursements of union funds." The court rejected Bath's argument that
conviction under the LMRDA requires a finding that the sum
must have been reported in a category other than the one in which
it was reported, noting that such a technical reading would defeat
the purpose of the Act.70 The court also held that proof of willful
violation is not necessary for conviction under the Act; knowledge
of the false or inaccurate statement is all that is required. 7'
The second count of Bath's conviction was not considered on
appeal, since reversal on that count would not alter the effect of
his two concurrent 18-month sentences.72 In a separate opinion,
Judge Holloway supported affirmation of the count one conviction, but would have reversed the conviction on count two, noting
that a person convicted under the LMRDA is barred from serving
as a union official for 5 years after such conviction, unless permitted to do so by the Board of Parole.73 The parole board's determination, it was argued, would be affected by the existence of two,
rather than one, convictions. 7
III. FAIR LABOR STANDARDS AcT75
Sections of the FLSA formed the basis of four Tenth Circuit
", Violating id. § 439(c).
" The benefits requested were available to union members whose jobs were affected
by labor disputes.
:9 504 F.2d at 459.
7o

Id.

71Id.
Id. at

72
457.
,1 Id. at 460-61, citing 29 U.S.C. § 504 (1970).
" 504 F.2d at 461. Judge Holloway also argued that the LMRDA should not apply to
reports between the local and the international unions, in view of the fact that the local
had additional, accurate receipts of the payments in its records. Id. at 461-62.
75 29 U.S.C. §§ 201-19 (1970) [hereinafter referred to as FLSA].
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cases in the last year. In Brennan v. Metropolitan Trash, Inc. 6
the court upheld the trial court's determination that the defendant was in fact subject to the provisions of the FLSA as an
employer whose employees were "engaged in commerce or in the
production of goods for commerce."" This finding was based on
evidence that 50 percent of defendant's customers were commercial in nature, that 95 percent of defendant's income was derived
from customers engaged in the production of goods for commerce,
and that 80 percent of defendant's equipment and repair items
78
were manufactured outside of Colorado.
Finding that defendant's services were "a closely related process or occupation directly essential to the production" of goods
for commerce, ' 9 the trial court ordered defendant to pay damages
of back wages at the rate of time and a half for all hours worked
in excess of 40 per week. This was correct in spite of the purely
local situs of the operation, because the defendant's activity was
an essential aspect and component of the manufacturing process
involved in interstate commerce, and not merely "isolated local
activity."'"
The Tenth Circuit stated that the established test under the
FLSA is whether an activity is closely related and directly essential to an instrumentality or facility of interstate commerce. 2 It
found that evidence developed at trial clearly indicated the essential relationship of defendant, a local refuse hauling firm, to the
interstate manufacturers it served.83
Nease v. Associated Properties, Inc.84 involved a claim for
overtime compensation of an apartment house manager for hours
he actually worked in excess of the 40 hours stipulated in the
contract of employment. The granting of defendant's motion for
summary judgment, which was based on a denial of the applica,' 513 F.2d 1324 (10th Cir. 1975).
Id. at 1324, citing 29 U.S.C. § 203(s) (1970).
1' Id. at 1325.
"

Id., citing 29 U.S.C. § 203(j) (1970).
29 U.S.C. § 207(a)(1) (1970).
513 F.2d at 1326, citing Mitchell v. C.W. Vollmer & Co., 349 U.S. 427, 429 (1955).
K2 Id.
7

Id., citing Schultz v. Instant Handling, Inc., 418 F.2d 1019 (5th Cir. 1969); Mitchell
v. Dooley Bros., 286 F.2d 40 (1st Cir. 1960), cert. denied, 366 U.S. 911 (1961).
' No. 74-1450 (10th Cir., June 9, 1975) (Not for Routine Publication).
1
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bility of the Act, 5 was affirmed. In this case, the aggregate gross
compensation received by defendant from all the properties it
managed was less than the $250,000 annual minimum required
to bring an employer within the Act.8" The court relied upon a
Supreme Court decision 7 which had held that the relevant measure of dollar-volume collected by an enterprise rendering
professional management services is gross commissions rather
than gross rentals.
In another case involving failure to pay overtime, the court
in Brennan v. Brendell Manufacturing Co. "8 affirmed the trial
court's injunction of future violations and its order requiring payment of back wages." The Tenth Circuit held that, for those
employed under contracts which provide for an annual salary and
require hours of work in excess of 40 per week, compliance of the
wage agreement with the FLSA would be tested in light of an
express agreement establishing the straight-time rate. Where no
such rate is agreed upon, and there exists no allocation of the
agreed salary between the statutory work week and overtime
hours, the straight-time rate will be determined by dividing the
total weekly compensation under the contract by the weekly
hours worked. 0 The case was remanded for further consideration
of the award, which limited recovery of back-overtime pay to
amounts which accrued to the time of filing of the complaint,
rather than to the time of trial. The Tenth Circuit questioned the
trial court's denial of its ability to award post-complaint relief."
9529 U.S.C.

§ 203(s) (1970).
I
Id.
Falk v. Brennan, 414 U.S. 190 (1975).
Nos. 73-1861, 73-1862 (10th Cir., Nov. 25, 1974) (Not for Routine Publication).
Id. The employer's actions were found to violate FLSA's requirements as to payment of overtime, 29 U.S.C. §§ 207, 215(a)(2) (1970), and as to making and preserving
records, id. §§ 211(c), 215(a)(5). Evidence was produced at trial showing that the defendant had manipulated records of hourly wages paid so as to appear to pay time and a half,
while actually paying only straight time. Nos. 73-1861, 73-1862 (10th Cir., Nov. 25, 1974)
(Not for Routine Publication).
90 Nos. 73-1861, 73-1862 (10th Cir., Nov. 25, 1974) (Not for Routine Publication). This
formula was adopted over defendant's theory that the wage agreement would comply with
FLSA if the compensation set by the contract is at least equal to the minimum wage times
40 plus one and one-half the minimum wage times hours in excess of 40. Id.
11Id. The court also held that it is proper for a trial court to delegate to the Secretary
of Labor the determination of the amount of the backpay award, so long as that determination is consistent with the evidence presented at trial. Id.
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In Brennan v. Peterson 2 the employer, found to have violated overtime, minimum wage, and child labor provisions of the
FLSA, agreed to comply with the Act. Thereafter, the employer
was found to have altered the records of actual hours worked by
his employees to avoid paying overtime. On appeal, the Tenth
Circuit considered the propriety of granting an injunction against
similar future violations. 3 The FLSA provides for the discretionary granting of such injunctions to prevent future or existing violations,94 but not to impose a penalty or punishment. 5 The trial
court had refused to issue an injunction against future violations.
The Tenth Circuit found this refusal an abuse of discretion in
light of evidence of the employer's continued violations and repeatedly broken promises to comply with the FLSA. 6 The case
was reversed and remanded for issuance of an injunction against
continued violations of the Act.
IV.

MISCELLANEOUS CASES

Under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967,11
an individual who claims a violation of the Act must give notice
to the Secretary of Labor within 180 days of any alleged occurrence. The Act also requires a 60-day period of notice to the
Secretary before suit is filed." In Law v. United Air Lines9 the
plaintiff alleged that his job application was rejected solely because of his age. However, he failed to file his notice of claim
within the 180-day period, and the Tenth Circuit affirmed the
trial court's dismissal of his suit.'00
Reemployment rights of veterans under the Military Selective Service Act'0 1 were considered in Jackson v. Beech Aircraft
Corp. 102Plaintiffs sought to determine whether the time they
spent in military service was to be included in computing their
retirement income benefits, eligibility for longevity pay, length of
11No. 74-1446

(10th Cir., May 7, 1975) (Not for Routine Publication).

93 Id,
'5

29 U.S.C. § 217 (1970).
No. 74-1446 (10th Cir., May 7, 1975) (Not for Routine Publication).
Id.

"

29 U.S.C. §§ 621-34 (1970).
Id. § 626(d).
519 F.2d 170 (10th Cir. 1975).

o Id.
"'
"

50, App. U.S.C. §§ 451-73 (1970).
517 F.2d 1322 (10th Cir. 1975).
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vacations, and rate of accrual of sick leave credits. The trial
court's holding that none of the four listed benefits was to be
included under the statute as "seniority rights"''03 was affirmed.0 4
The Tenth Circuit agreed with the trial court that computation
of those benefits should be governed by rules and regulations
propounded by the employer. 05 The retirement plan and collective bargaining agreement from which these benefits were derived
were found to provide the four benefits on the basis of substantial
work for the employer, and not on seniority alone.'"'
ChristopherM. Brandt

SECTION

10(b)

REVISITED

NLRB v. R. L. Sweet Lumber Co., 515 F.2d 785
(10th Cir. 1975)
THOMAS

B. BUESCHER*

INTRODUCTION

In 1974 the Tenth Circuit adopted a new approach to problems created by the 6-month statute of limitations contained in
section 10(b) of the National Labor Relations Act.' The court, in
NLRB v. Serv-All Co.,' had adopted the rationale of the Sixth
Circuit 3 in holding that the proper approach to a section 10(b)
issue should be to look at the burdens on the defense.' The court
got a chance to apply its new rationale in NLRB v. R. L. Sweet
Lumber Co. 5 The basic question in Sweet Lumber was whether
"0

50, App. U.S.C. § 459(b), (c) (1970).
517 F.2d at 1327.
IId. at 1325.
IId. at 1326.

* Associate, Law Offices of Walter C. Brauer III, Denver. Colorado, A.B., Duke
University, 1972; J.D., University of Denver, 1975.
1 29 U.S.C. § 160(b) (1970) [hereinafter cited as the Act].
2 491 F.2d 1273 (10th Cir. 1974).
3 NLRB v. McCready & Sons, Inc., 482 F.2d 872 (6th Cir. 1973).
' For a discussion of this approach and an analysis of the Serv-A I decision, see Tenth
Circuit Survey, 52 DENVER L.J. 279 (1975).
1 515 F.2d 785 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 44 U.S.L.W. 3305 (U.S. Nov. 18, 1975) (No.
75-321),
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charges of unfair labor practices, which the defendant alleged
were based on a collective bargaining agreement signed more
than 6 months prior to filing, were barred by the section 10(b)
limitation period.' Instead of using its "burden on the defense"
test, however, the court took a more traditional approach which
will be of greater aid in future cases. This comment will examine
that approach.
I. THE FACTS IN Sweet Lumber
In order to understand the court's decision, it is important
to look at the sequence of events which led to the filing of unfair
labor practice charges against Sweet Lumber and to recognize
that the crucial date is February 19, 1972. Any event occurring
before that date which may have constituted an unfair labor practice would be barred by the 6-month statute of limitations contained in section 10(b).
Sweet Lumber was engaged in the wholesale and retail sale
of lumber and related products, and the manufacture of prefabricated homes. The employees at Sweet Lumber were represented
by two different unions: The warehouse and yard employees were
represented by Teamsters Local 541 (Teamsters), while the employees engaged in the manufacturing process were represented
by Carpenters Local 1635 (Carpenters).' In June 1971 the board
of directors of Sweet Lumber decided to establish a separate company to produce prefabricated homes. This new company was to
be called Standard Homes and was to be located approximately
19 miles from the original Sweet Lumber site.8 Sweet Lumber
continued to manufacture prefabricated homes until February
29, 1972, at which time production began at Standard Homes.'
In early January 1972, preparations for 'occupying the Standard Homes facility had begun. Four employees had been hired
to handle lumber which had begun to arrive. One of these employees was a Teamsters member from the Sweet Lumber facility
and the other three were new employees. 0 On January 24, 1972,
The NLRB alleged that Sweet Lumber had violated sections 8(a)(1), (2), (3), and
(5) of the Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 158(a)(1), (2), (3), (5) (1970).
515 F.2d at 787.
Standard Homes Company was incorporated separately from Sweet Lumber on
October 31, 1971, but Mrs. Sweet, the president of Sweet Lumber, was also the president
of Standard Homes. Id. at 788.
g Id. at 792 n.8.
Id. at 788.
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the business agent of Teamsters obtained signed authorization
cards from the four employees then working at Standard Homes.
The business agent took these cards to the vice president and the
attorney for Sweet Lumber and demanded recognition. After verifying the signatures on the cards, the president and attorney
agreed to bargain with the Teamsters, and on February 11, 1972,
a contract between the Teamsters and Standard was executed."
The contract covered "all production and maintenance employees at the Employer's Olathe, Kansas [Standard Homes] plant
including truck drivers."'" The contract also contained a union
security clause requiring employees of Standard Homes to become members of the Teamsters within 31 days after beginning
employment. 3
In February 1972 the vice president of Standard Homes
began interviewing employees at Sweet Lumber to see if they
would be interested in accepting employment at Standard
Homes. Four men who were working in the prefabrication operation, all members of Carpenters, eventually accepted employment at Standard Homes.' During the interviews, they were told
by the vice president of Standard Homes that there would be only
one union at the company, the Teamsters. They began working
at Standard Homes on February 23, 1972.11
On February 20, 1972, a representative of the Carpenters
approached the vice president of Sweet Lumber to discuss the
transfer of employees from Sweet Lumber to Standard Homes.
The vice president stated that "there was nothing to discuss"
because Standard Homes was completely separate from Sweet
Lumber. 6 At that time the Carpenters' representative indicated
that he would file a grievance concerning the transfers.
The NLRB first found that Sweet Lumber and Standard
Homes were a single employer under the Act. 7 On the basis of
Id.
" Id. at 789.

13Id.
1,Id.While these employees were originally offered a wage rate of $3.75 per hour, all
were eventually paid the "leadman" rate of $4.50 per hour under the Teamsters contract.
While at Sweet Lumber, they had all been making $5.065 per hour under the Carpenters
contract. Id. n.3.
11Id. at 789.
16Id.

1729 U.S.C. § 152(2) (1970).
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this finding, the NLRB concluded that the prefabrication employees at Standard Homes were an accretion to the Carpenters'
bargaining unit at the Sweet Lumber facility"8 and that Sweet
Lumber had committed the following unfair labor practices:
1. Sweet Lumber, by and through Standard Homes, rendered
unlawful assistance and support to the Teamsters in violation of §
8(a)(1) and (2).
2. Sweet Lumber, by and through Standard Homes, enforced
the provisions of the union security agreement of the Teamster contract against certain employees at Standard Homes' Olathe plant,
thereby encouraging membership in the Teamsters and discouraging membership in the Carpenters, in violation of § 8(a)(1) and (3).
3. Sweet Lumber, by and through Standard Homes, refused to
bargain collectively with the Carpenters as the exclusive representative of certain employees of Standard Homes' Olathe plant and
unilaterally changed the terms and conditions of employment of
said employees, in violation of § 8(a)(1) and (5)."1

These were the findings which Sweet Lumber appealed to the
Tenth Circuit, primarily on the basis that all of the alleged unfair
practice charges were barred by the section 10(b) statute of limitations.

II.

THE TENTH CIRCUIT'S APPROACH

In challenging the NLRB's findings that the unfair labor
practices charged against it were not time-barred, Sweet Lumber
relied primarily on Serv-A11 0 and Machinists Local 1424 v.
NLRB. 1 Essentially, Sweet Lumber argued that all of the unfair
labor practice findings made by the NLRB were dependent upon
the legitimacy of the contract with the Teamsters at the Standard
Homes facility. Since this contract was executed on February 11,
1972, 6 months and 8 days prior to the filing of the charges, Sweet
Lumber argued that all charges must be barred by section 10(b).22
" While Sweet Lumber challenged both of these findings, neither will be discussed
here. The single employer determination "is essentially a factual one and will not be set
aside unless clearly erroneous." 515 F.2d at 793. The court found substantial evidence in
the whole record to support the NLRB's conclusion. The finding of an accretion is a
discretionary function of the NLRB and "should not be set aside unless the Board has
acted in an arbitrary and capricious manner." Id. at 794. There was no evidence to support
any allegations that the NLRB was arbitrary and capricious, and the court described the
record as "amply sustaining the accretion finding." Id.
1 Id. at 787.
20 491 F.2d 1273 (10th Cir. 1974).

2- 362 U.S. 411 (1960). This case is hereinafter referred to as the Bryan case.
12515 F.2d at 790.
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Placed in terms of Serv-AU, Sweet Lumber claimed that its
defense to the charges would entail reliance on facts which occurred outside the 6-month limitations period. This reliance, it
argued, would place too great a burden on the defense, the very
evil which Serv-AUI was intended to eliminate. However, the court
did not agree with that characterization of Serv-AU1. In Serv-All
an employer had repeatedly refused to sign a collective bargaining agreement, with the first refusal occurring more than 6
months before charges were filed with the NLRB. The NLRB had
argued Serv-All on a recurring violation theory. The court did not
view Sweet Lumber as a recurring violation case; instead, it found
that the case presented "a problem whether conduct which itself
is the gravamen of the unfair labor
practices charged occurred
2' 3
within the section 10(b) period.

Sweet Lumber's reliance on Bryan created a more difficult
problem for the court due to the close factual similarity of the two
cases. In Bryan the employer had entered into a collective bargaining agreement with Machinists Local 1424 at a time when the
union did not represent the majority of the employees. 4 The contract in Bryan, as in Sweet Lumber, contained a union security
clause requiring all employees to become members of the union
within 45 days of the commencement of their employment. This
contract was later renegotiated and reexecuted, and, finally, two
charges were filed against the union, 10 and 12 months after the
execution of the original agreement. The charges claimed that the
agreement was void in that it was executed at a time when the
union did not represent a majority of the employees.25
In holding that the charges in Bryan were barred by section
10(b), the Supreme Court discussed two different situations. The
first involved "occurrences within the six-month limitation period [which] in and of themselves [constituted], as a substantive matter, unfair labor practices. 2 8 In such a case any unfair
labor practices occurring outside of the 6-month time period
could be used as evidence "to shed light on the true character of
matters occurring within the limitations period." In the second
U

Id. at 792.
362 U.S. at 412.

, Id. at 412-14.
2

2

Id. at 416.
Id.
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situation, "conduct occurring within the limitations period
[could] be charged to be an unfair labor practice only through
the reliance on an earlier unfair labor practice." 8 In such a circumstance the earlier unfair labor practice served "to cloak with
illegality that which was otherwise lawful.""9
Sweet Lumber argued that its case fell directly within the
circumstances described in the second situation. It argued that
it could only be found to have committed an unfair labor practice
if the contract it signed with the Teamsters was invalid. Since
that contract had been signed prior to February 19, its validity
was beyond scrutiny. The Tenth Circuit, while noting that the
case was "not free from doubt," concluded that under the circumstances the contract execution date was not the controlling fac30
tor.
In order to understand the correctness of the Tenth Circuit
holding, it is important to understand two things. First, one must
recognize the NLRB's finding, affirmed by the court, that the
Standard Homes' plant was an accretion to the Sweet Lumber
Company's original plant. 3 Second, one must understand exactly
what conduct the NLRB found to be violative of the Act.32 Once
the NLRB had made its accretion finding, it then went on to hold
that Sweet Lumber: (1) Illegally assisted the Teamsters in violation of section 8(a)(2); (2) illegally discriminated against members of the Carpenters in violation of section 8(a)(3); and (3)
refused to bargain with the Carpenters in violation of section
8(a) (5). The 8(a)(2) and (3) findings were based upon the application of the union security agreement in the Teamsters contract
to employees who were members of the Carpenters unit at the
original Sweet Lumber plant. The administrative law judge,
whose opinion was adopted by the NLRB, said:
The application of a collective-bargaining agreement with one
labor organization (here Teamsters) and enforcement of that conId. at 416-17.
Id. at 417.
515 F.2d at 792.
Without such a finding, the only possible unfair labor practice which could have
been proved against Sweet Lumber was a refusal-to-bargain charge based on the February
20 refusal to discuss the Standard Homes operations with the Carpenters' representative.
" While it is not altogether clear, it will be assumed that the 8(a)(1) interference
charge was derivative, i.e., that in violating other sections of the Act, Sweet Lumber
interfered with the exercise of its employees' section 7 rights.
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tract's union-security provisions to employees in a different unit
represented by a different labor organization (here Carpenters) is
violative of Section 8(a)(1), (2), and (3) of the Act even though the
contract thus applied and enforced was entered into prior to the
33
10(b) period.

This observation highlights an important distinction between Sweet Lumberand Bryan. In Bryan the charge was based
on the enforcement of a union security clause contained in an
agreement that had been illegally signed more than 6 months
before the filing of the charge. However, in Sweet Lumber the
NLRB was not condemning the enforcement of the union security
clause, but, rather, it was claiming that the enforcement of that
clause against certain members of an existing collective bargaining unit was a violation of the Act. At this point the importance
of the NLRB's accretion conclusion is dramatically underscored,
for, if there had been no accretion in this case, the only thing the
NLRB could have argued was that the general enforcement of the
union security clause was violative of the Act. Such an argument
would have fallen directly within the second situation described
in Bryan, and the court would have had to conclude that the
charges were barred by section 10(b). However, because of the
accretion finding, the application of any agreement, besides the
Carpenters agreement, to the employees at the new Standard
Homes plant would have been a violation of the Act. Since the
union security clause did not come into operation until after February 19, any unfair labor practice charge based on the enforcement of that clause was within the 6-month limitations period.
Similarly, the 8(a)(5) refusal-to-bargain charge was based on
the application to the Carpenters of the contract, not just the
union security agreement. By applying the Teamsters contract to
the members of the Carpenters, Sweet Lumber unilaterally
changed the hours and working conditions of the Carpenters.
Again, it is irrelevant when the Teamsters contract was signed,
because, even if that contract was entirely legal, its application
to the members of the Carpenters could never have been legal,
given the accretion finding.
In reaching its conclusion, the Tenth Circuit relied in part on
Shumate v. NLRB.3 4 In Shumate the plaintiffs resigned from a
207 N.L.R.B. 529, 537 (1973) (footnote omitted); White Front Stores, Inc., 166
N.L.R.B. 175 (1967); Wolfer Printing Co., 145 N.L.R.B. 695 (1963).
34 452 F.2d 717 (4th Cir. 1971).
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union during a strike and crossed the picket line. The strike was
ended on October 9, 1967, and, later that month, the union filed
charges against the employees. The union then found the employees guilty in an internal union trial and fined them in November
1967. In April 1968 the union sent a letter to the employees demanding that the fine be paid and threatening legal action if it
was not. On May 21, 1968, the union filed a suit in state court to
collect the fine. Finally, in June 1968 the employees filed unfair
labor practice charges against the union. 35 The NLRB found that
the charges were barred by section 10(b), but the Fourth Circuit
reversed, claiming that the case fell within the first situation
described in Bryan.35
The importance of Shumate is not so much that it supports
the Tenth Circuit's holding, but that its dissent sets out a relatively easy-to-understand test for similar 10(b) problems. The
majority had found that the letter demanding payment and the
filing of the state court suit were, in and of themselves, unfair
labor practices. The dissent raised an interesting point by posing
the following question: "[H]ad this case proceeded to its merits,
would not the determinative premise have been the legality of the
expulsion and the levy?" ' 37 In Sweet Lumber that question became: Was the determinative premise in the NLRB's finding of
a violation of the Act the legality of the Teamsters contract? The
answer to that question is obviously no. In finding violations of
section 8(a)(2), (3), and (5), it was totally irrelevant whether the
Teamsters contract was in fact legal. Even if one assumes that
the contract was legal, when it was applied to the members of the
Carpenters bargaining unit it changed the terms of their
employment without consulting their bargaining representative.
When the union security clause was enforced against the new
employees at Standard Homes, discrimination against the Carpenters resulted because they were Carpenters, not merely because they were employees. The enforcement of that clause also
assisted the Teamsters, not in relation to the new employee who
was not a member of the Carpenters at the Sweet Lumber plant,
but with respect to the members of the Carpenters bargaining
unit at Sweet Lumber. Again, it can be seen that the NLRB's
This recitation of the facts is taken from the dissenting opinion. Id. at 721.
"

Id. at 719.
Id. at 722.
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finding of an accretion was really the key factor in this case.
Without such a finding the answer to the question paraphrased
above would have to be in the affirmative.
CONCLUSION

In Sweet Lumber the Tenth Circuit found that in order to
correctly analyze a section 10(b) limitations question, it is necessary to look beyond the burdens on the defense. Instead, the court
used an analytically correct, albeit more difficult, approach
which should be used in all future 10(b) cases. First, it is necessary to understand the facts and the exact sequence of their occurrence. Then one must understand exactly what actions are
alleged to be unfair labor practices. Finally, one must determine
exactly why these alleged actions are unfair labor practices. If
they are unlawful only because of an activity which occurred
more than 6 months prior to the filing of a charge, then the charge
is barred by section 10(b) and the complaint must be dismissed.
However, if the activities are unlawful without reference to any
other acts outside the limitations period, section 10(b) does not
bar the charge. The use of such an approach should aid all those
who are faced with the horrors section 10(b) can cause.

Boys Markets RULE APPLIED
Chief Freight Lines Co. v. Teamsters Local 886,
514 F.2d 572 (10th Cir. 1975)
By

CLAY

R.

SMITH*

The much disputed "narrow" holding of Boys Markets, Inc.
v. Retail Clerks Local 7701 was the focal point of the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals' analysis in Chief Freight Lines Co. v.
Teamsters Local 886.2 Holding that the district court erred in
granting to an employer injunctive relief against a threatened
strike while simultaneously granting a stay of arbitration, the
* Associate of the Law Offices of John McKendree, Denver, Colorado; B.A., 1970,
University of Virginia; J.D., 1975, University of Denver.
398 U.S. 235, 253 (1970).
2 514 F.2d 572 (10th Cir. 1975).
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Tenth Circuit revealed a predilection to view the Boys Markets
exception to the Norris-LaGuardia Act 3 as a limited
accommodation between the express terms of Norris-LaGuardia
and the federal policy favoring resolution of industrial strife by
arbitral resolution pursuant to section 301 of the Labor Management Relations Act of 1947, as amended.' Before a discussion of
the unique facts and legal issues confronting the Tenth Circuit in
Chief Freight Lines, a brief review of Boys Markets, those decisions leading up to it, and the federal policies at issue is useful
in placing Chief Freight Lines in its proper perspective.
I. Boys Markets: AN OVERVIEW
As part of the 1947 Taft-Hartley amendments to the National Labor Relations Act, Congress added section 301(a), which
provided for, inter alia, "[sluits for violation of contracts between an employer and a labor organization representing employwithout respect to the
ees in an industry affecting commerce.
amount in controversy or without regard to the citizenship of the
parties.'' s
In Textile Workers Union v. Lincoln Mills of Alabama,' the
United States Supreme Court held that section 301(a) constituted not only a simple grant of federal jurisdiction, but also a
mandate for courts7 to fashion a body of federal substantive law
to effectuate the purposes and policies of the Act.8 Lincoln Mills
identified maintenance of industrial peace as a prime, if not the
prime, purpose of the Act, and the Court determined that specific
performance of contractual undertakings served that purpose.' Of
particular relevance instantly was the fact that the contractual
3 29 U.S.C. §§ 101-15 (1970) [hereinafter cited as Norris-LaGuardia]. Generally
speaking, Norris-LaGuardia proscribes federal courts from issuing injunctions in a case
growing out of a "labor dispute," as defined in section 4 thereof. Id. § 104. Section 4(a) of
Norris-LaGuardia specifically provides that no federal court shall have jurisdiction to
issue injunctive relief to restrain individuals from "[cleasing or refusing to perform any
work or to remain in any relation of employment ... " Id. § 104(a).
I Id. § 185. The Labor Management Relations Act will hereinafter be referred to as
the Act.
IId. § 185(a).
6 353 U.S. 448 (1957).
1 Charles Dowd Box Co. v. Courtney, 368 U.S. 502 (1962), established that section
301(a) jurisdiction was concurrent between state and federal courts.
353 U.S. at 456-57.
Id. at 455. See Retail Clerks Local 128 v. Lion Dry Goods, Inc., 369 U.S. 17 (1962);
cf. Smith v. UMW, 493 F.2d 1241 (10th Cir. 1974).
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undertaking sought to be specifically enforced in Lincoln Mills
was an agreement to arbitrate disputes. 0 To order specific performance of an arbitration clause, however, the Court was required to overcome two significant hurdles-the common law rule
against enforcing executory agreements to arbitrate and the antiinjunction provisions of the Norris-LaGuardia Act." As to the
first hurdle, the Court relied on legislative history to determine
that Congress, by enacting section 301, intended to abrogate the
common law rule. 2 As to the Norris-LaGuardia Act, the Court
stated:
Though a literal reading might bring the dispute within the terms
of the [Norris-LaGuardia] Act . . . we see no justification in policy
for restricting § 301(a) to damage suits, leaving specific performance
of a contract to arbitrate grievance disputes to the inapposite procedural requirements of that Act .

. .

. The congressional policy in

favor of the enforcement of agreements to arbitrate grievance disputes being clear, there is no reason to submit
them to the require3
ments of § 7 of the Norris-LaGuardia Act.

Lincoln Mills, finally, established firmly the notion that the
promise by an employer to arbitrate disputes was the quid pro
quo for an agreement not to strike by the labor organization." The
federal policy favoring arbitration of disputes espoused in Lincoln
Mills was to become the cornerstone of the federal substantive
law flowing from judicial construction of section 301.11
353 U.S. at 449.
A third hurdle-the constitutionality of section 301 if regarded as a grant of power
to develop a substantive body of federal law-was discussed at length in Justice
Frankfurter's dissent. 353 U.S. at 460.
Id. at 456.

'

Id. at 458-59 (footnotes and citations omitted). Section 7 of Norris-LaGuardia
provides for the issuance of injunctions in labor disputes under limited circumstances and
under stringent procedural requirements.
"

"

Id. at 455.

Gateway Coal Co. v. UMW, 414 U.S. 368 (1974); Operating Eng'r Local 150 v. Flair
Builders, Inc., 406 U.S. 487 (1972); Carey v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 375 U.S. 261
(1964); John Wiley & Sons, Inc. v. Livingston, 376 U.S. 543 (1964); Teamsters Local 174
v. Lucas Flower Co., 369 U.S. 95 (1962); Drake Bakeries, Inc. v. Bakery Workers Local
50, 370 U.S. 254 (1962); United Steelworkers v. Enterprise Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S.
593 (1960); United Steelworkers v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574 (1960);
United Steelworkers v. American Mfg. Co., 363 U.S. 564 (1960); Carpenters Dist. Council
v. Brady Corp., 513 F.2d 1 (10th Cir. 1975); UAW v. Folding Carrier Corp., 422 F.2d 47
(10th Cir. 1970); Johnson Builders, Inc. v. Carpenters Local 1095, 422 F.2d 137 (10th Cir.
1970); Locomotive Firemen Local 844 v. Kennecott Copper Corp., 338 F.2d 224 (10th Cir.
1964); UAW v. Cardwell Mfg. Co., 304 F.2d 801 (10th Cir. 1962); Machinists Local 1912
"

DENVER LAW JOURNAL

VOL. 53

While the Supreme Court was willing in Lincoln Mills to
accommodate the express provisions of the Norris-LaGuardia Act
to permit the specific performance of an arbitration provision, it
was unwilling in Sinclair Refining Co. v. Atkinson"6 to enjoin
employees from engaging in work stoppages over disputes susceptible of resolution through mandatory grievance and arbitration
procedures. Speaking for a five-justice majority, Justice Black
rejected the idea that section 301 sanctions piecemeal judicial
repeal of the Norris-LaGuardia Act. 7 He based his rejection on
the failure of Congress to repeal explicitly the anti-injunction
provisions of Norris-LaGuardia as to section 301 actions along
with an analysis of legislative history. This analysis showed, inter
alia, that a House-passed repeal of Norris-LaGuardia antiinjunction provisions as to section 301 actions had been deleted
in the House-Senate Conference Committee. 9 Lincoln Mills was
distinguished because it did not enjoin any conduct falling within
one of the specific anti-injunction prohibitions of the NorrisLaGuardia Act."0
Mr. Justice Brennan, along with Justices Douglas and Harlan, dissented in Sinclair, and his dissent was, for all practical
purposes, to become the majority opinion 8 years later in Boys
Markets. Justice Brennan argued that section 301 and the NorrisLaGuardia Act should be read in pari materia and that, if the
policy of securing peaceful resolution of industrial disputes underlying section 301 could be effected without substantial prejudice to the underlying purpose of Norris-LaGuardia, section 301
should prevail.' Noting that Norris-LaGuardia was enacted in
response to abuses by the federal judiciary in enjoining lawful
concerted activity by workers, the dissent contended that the
majority's decision ignored the fact that the union's work stoppages were in direct contravention of a no-strike pledge and
applicable grievance and arbitration procedures." The majority
v. United States Potash Co., 270 F.2d 496 (10th Cir. 1959), cert. denied, 363 U.S. 845
(1960).
" 370 U.S. 195 (1962).
" Id. at 209.
S Id. at 205.
" Id. at 206-07.

Id. at 212.
11Id. at 225.

Id. at 228. The applicable Sinclair arbitration provisions are reported in the appen-
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decision, rather, dealt a "crippling blow" to the arbitral process,
because, it was said, unions could resort to self-help measures to
resolve disputes properly relegated to the grievance and arbitration procedure. The dissent posited as a necessary consequence
of an employer's inability to enjoin such self-help measures a
future reluctance on the part of employers to commit themselves
"to obligations enforceable against them but not against their
unions. 2 3 "Accommodation [between section 301 and the
Norris-LaGuardia Act]," Justice Brennan stated, "requires only
that the anti-injunction policy of Norris-LaGuardia not intrude
into areas, not vital to its ends, where injunctive relief is vital to
a purpose of § 301 ... ."24 In lieu of the majority decision, the
dissent offered the following formula for effecting "accommodation" between section 301 and the Norris-LaGuardia Act:
A District Court entertaining an action under § 301 may not
grant injunctive relief against concerted activity unless and until it
decides that the case is one in which an injunction would be appropriate despite the Norris-LaGuardia Act. When a strike is sought to
be enjoined because it is over a grievance which both parties are
contractually bound to arbitrate, the District Court may issue no
injunctive order until it holds that the contract does have that effect; and the employer should be ordered to arbitrate, as a condition
of his obtaining an injunction against the strike. Beyond this, the
District Court must, of course, consider whether issuance of an injunction would be warranted under ordinary principles of equity-whether breaches are occurring and will continue, or have
been threatened and will be committed; whether they have caused
or will cause irreparable injury to the employer; and whether the
employer will suffer more from the denial of an injunction than will
the union from its issuance."

The above would later become the "narrow" holding of Boys
Markets.26
The Norris-LaGuardia Act does not affect jurisdiction of
state courts to issue injunctive relief in "labor disputes." Avco v.
Machinists Aero Lodge 735,2 however, held that an employer's
state court action to enjoin a work stoppage in breach of a nodix to the companion case of Atkinson v. Sinclair Refining Co. Id. at 250. The no-strike
provision is quoted in Atkinson. Id. at 241 n.1.
" Id. at 227.
" Id. at 225.
2 Id. at 228.

398 U.S. at 254.
390 U.S. 557 (1968).
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strike clause and over grievances subject to a mandatory arbitration procedure could be removed to federal court where the state
court injunction could be dissolved." Thus, Avco foreclosed the
issuance of meaningful injunctive relief against breaches of nostrike clauses occurring because of or over otherwise grievable or
arbitrable disputes.
Two years after Avco, the Supreme Court decided Boys
Markets. Like Avco and Sinclair, Boys Markets involved a work
stoppage by employees over a dispute which was subject to a
binding grievance and arbitration clause.2 9 Noting that the
"practical effect" of Avco was to oust state courts of section
301(a) jurisdiction in suits seeking injunctive relief for breach of
no-strike obligations and to encourage "rampant forum shopping, ' 30 the Court chose to overrule explicitly the Sinclair
decision. The Court reasoned that the "devastating implications
for the enforceability of arbitration agreements and their accompanying no-strike obligations if equitable remedies were not
available" militated against extension of the Sinclairholding to
state courts, and then stated:
[Tihe very purpose of arbitration procedures is to provide a mechanism for the expeditious settlement of industrial disputes without
resort to strikes, lockouts, or other self-help measures. This basic
purpose is obviously largely undercut if there is no immediate, effective remedy for those very tactics that arbitration is designed to
obviate.3 1'

The remainder of the Boys Markets decision reiterated and specifically adopted the "accommodation" reasoning of the Sinclair
dissent and balanced the "literal terms" of the Norris-LaGuardia
Act against the strong federal policy favoring "administrative
techniques for the peaceful resolution of industrial disputes" developed under section 301.32 The Court then concluded by stating:
Our holding in the present case is a narrow one. We do not undermine the vitality of the Norris-LaGuardia Act. We deal only with
Id. at 560-61. Removal procedures are set forth in 28 U.S.C. § 1441 (1970). Avco
further held that section 4 of Norris-LaGuardia, 29 U.S.C. § 104 (1970), was merely a
restriction on the equity powers of a federal court and not a plenary withdrawal of subject
matter jurisdiction in actions where injunctive relief was sought in a labor dispute. 390
U.S. at 561.
398 U.S. at 238-39.
Id. at 244-46.
, Id. at 249.

32 Id. at 251.
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the situation in which a collective-bargaining contract contains a
mandatory grievance adjustment or arbitration procedure. Nor does
it follow from what we have said that injunctive relief is appropriate
as a matter of course in every case of a strike over an arbitrable

grievance

.

.

..

The Court then specifically adopted the Sinclairdissent's principles for the issuance of injunctive relief.
The Boys Markets decision was the product of a lengthy
gestation. Indeed, to place Boys Markets in its proper perspective
it has been necessary to trace its somewhat tortuous development
from Lincoln Mills because of the unique nature of the "accommodation" of the express provisions of the Norris-LaGuardia Act
with the powerful federal policy derived from decisional law
under section 301 favoring arbitration of disputes. Nonetheless,
the "accommodation" reached in Boys Markets was an uneasy
one, and its holding narrowed to protecting the integrity of the
arbitral process.
II. Chief Freight Lines: Boys Markets APPLIED
Chief Freight Lines involved a unique and somewhat complex fact pattern. The Chief Freight Lines Company (Chief
Freight) was signatory to the 1970-1973 National Master Freight
Agreement (NMFA) and the Local Freight Forwarding Pickup
and Delivery Supplemental Agreement (Supplemental Agreement) with Teamster Local 886. The NMFA and the Supplemental Agreement functioned together as a single collective bargaining agreement between Chief Freight and Local 886, and both
agreements contained articles providing for the mandatory adjustment of grievances. 3 Both agreements also proscribed work
stoppages pending the exhaustion of these grievance/arbitration
procedures.3 Article 2, section 3 of the NMFA further provided:
[Wihen a majority of the eligible employees performing work covered by an Agreement designated by the National Negotiating Com-

mittee to be Supplemental to the National Master Freight Agreement (to which their Employer is a prior signator), execute a card
authorizing a signatory Local Union to represent them as their

collective bargaining agent at the terminal location, then, such em-

'

Id. at 253.
514 F.2d at 580.

"

Id
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ployees shall automatically be covered by this Agreement and the
applicable Supplemental Agreements.3

On June 8, 1973, representatives of Local 886 presented to
Chief Freight a sufficient number of signed authorization cards
which, if the company were a "prior signator" under article 2,
section 3, would have entitled the local to represent Chief
Freight's Oklahoma City office employees. However, the company contended that it was not a "prior signator," arguing that
"prior signator" meant previous execution of the Supplemental
Agreement covering office employees, to which Chief Freight was
not a signator. Because of the company's refusal to recognize
Local 886 as the representative of the Oklahoma City office employees, that local and other Teamster locals established pickets
at certain of Chief Freight's terminals. Employees governed by
the NMFA and Supplemental Agreements refused to cross the
pickets. As a consequence, Chief Freight obtained a temporary
restraining order pursuant to Boys Markets, and a hearing, apparently on the company's motion for preliminary injunction
followed. However, during the hearing, the parties entered into a
settlement stipulation under which Chief Freight's civil action
was to be dismissed and the representational dispute was to be
resolved pursuant to the provisions of the NMFA and the Supplemental Agreement. Upon execution of the settlement stipulation,
the action was dismissed without prejudice.
Following the dismissal, the grievance was submitted to the
Southern Area Multi-State Grievance Committee which deadlocked and referred the dispute to the next arbitral step, the
Southern Area Conference Grievance Committee (Area Committee). The Area Committee determined that Local 886 was to present to Chief Freight authorization cards for verification. "If Local
Union 886 represents a majority of the affected employees that
were employed as of 6-8-73," the company was to apply the
NMFA and the office employees Supplemental Agreement to the
37
Oklahoma City office employees.
Id. at 574 n.1.
Id. at 575. Authorization cards constitute one method of showing that a labor union
has been selected as the collective bargaining representative of a majority of employees
within an appropriate bargaining unit. However, an employer under prevailing NLRB
procedures can demand an election to be conducted by the NLRB pursuant to Section 9
of the Act, 29 U.S.C. § 159 (1970), and, if the employer so demands, no statutory duty to
bargain will attach before the conduct of such election absent independent unfair labor
"

'7
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After the Area Committee's decision, Local 886 contended
that final and binding arbitration of the dispute, as contemplated
by the settlement stipulation, had been effected and that no further processing of the grievance was required. Chief Freight, however, argued that article 8 of the NMFA, which provided for submission to the National Grievance Committee of disputes involving the interpretation of the NMFA, had not been exhausted and
that, in any event, the Area Committee's award was ambiguous
and unenforceable. Local 886 then threatened to strike, and Chief
Freight obtained another temporary restraining order after persuading the district court to reopen the previously dismissed case.
Moreover, upon the company's application, the temporary restraining order further provided for a stay of arbitration pending
the outcome of NLRB action on a representation petition filed for
the Oklahoma City office employees by a union rival to Local 886,
the Fifth Wheel Employees' Association (Fifth Wheel).
An initial hearing on Chief's motion for preliminary injunction was held on February 27, 1975, by which time the NLRB had
intervened. The NLRB also requested a stay of arbitration pending resolution of both the question of representation and certain
unfair labor practice charges filed by Fifth Wheel against both
Chief Freight and Local 886. At the conclusion of the February
27th hearing, the district court issued oral findings of fact and law
but refused to enter a preliminary injunction until it was prepared in writing. The temporary restraining order and stay of
arbitration was continued in effect. At a subsequent formal hearing, the district court found, as a matter of fact, that the company
had been inadvertently misled in the settlement stipulation as to
the specific arbitration provisions under the NMFA applicable to
the representational dispute and that both it and Local 886 had
failed to agree to the submission to arbitration of the "prior signator" question under the settlement stipulation. The court further
found that the Area Committee's decision was interlocutory in
nature and that it was ambiguous and unenforceable. The formal
preliminary injunction enjoined Local 886 from striking or picketing, or threatening to strike or picket. More important, the preliminary injunction stayed arbitral proceedings pending determipractices by the employer. NLRB v. Gissel Packing Co., 395 U.S. 575, 594-97 (1969). Thus,
article 2, section 3 of the NMFA, and the Area Committee's award, imposed obligations
upon Chief Freight not otherwise present under prevailing law.
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nation of the question concerning representation of the Oklahoma
City clerical employees by the NLRB.
After disposing of various procedural objections by Local
886,'3 the Tenth Circuit turned to the first of the local's contentions concerning the inapplicability of Boys Markets relief-that
the Area Committee's award was final and binding and hence a
Boys Markets injunction was improper. The court noted, "[i]f
[Local 886's] position is correct, of course there is no basis for
an injunction to forestall a strike while arbitration proceeds as
provided for by the collective bargaining agreement. 3' 9 Nonetheless, the court found Local 886's position vis-a-vis the Area Committee's decision to be incorrect and sustained, as not clearly
erroneous, the district court's finding of fact concerning the settlement stipulation and the ambiguity of the Area Committee's
award.4" The effect of sustaining the district court's findings was
that the Area Committee's decision was not "final and binding"
and, as a consequence, the Area Committee award itself did not
render the Boys Markets injunction improper. 4
The heart of the Chief Freight Lines decision is concerned
with the propriety of Boys Markets injunctive relief when joined
with a stay of arbitration. The court noted that the "essential
requirements" for Boys Markets relief were present: (1) A collective bargaining agreement with mandatory grievance or arbitra1, Id. at 576-78. This note will not discuss the procedural aspects of the Chief Freight
Lines decision dealing with the propriety of the district court's reopening of the case
pursuant to FED. R. Civ. P. 60(b), nor the jurisdiction of the district court to proceed with
the hearing after Local 886 had filed its notice of appeal from the district court's oral
preliminary injunction.
3, Id. at 578.
, Id. at 579-80. That portion of the Chief Freight Lines decision dealing with the
ineffectiveness of the settlement stipulation involved a unique problem since, ordinarily,
the issue is whether the arbitrator exceeded his authority under a given stipulation. See,
e.g., Retail Store Employees Local 782 v. Sav-On Groceries, 508 F.2d 500 (10th Cir.
1975). In Chief Freight Lines, however, the issue appears to be a lack of mutuality of
understanding as to, inter alia, the issue submitted to arbitration, which lack of mutuality.
vitiated the validity of the entire settlement stipulation.
" The clear thrust of this portion of the Chief Freight Lines decision is that, had the
decision been "final and binding," Boys Markets relief would have been improper. Such
a holding would be in concert with existing authorities. See generally Narragansett Improvement Co. v. Teamsters Local 251, 390 F. Supp. 647 (D.R.I. 1974), vacated and rev'd
per curiarn, 506 F.2d 715 (lst Cir. 1974); Associated Gen. Contractors v. Teamsters Union,
454 F.2d 1324 (7th Cir. 1972); Pilot Freight Carriers, Inc. v. Teamsters Union, 353 F. Supp.
869 (M.D.N.C. 1972).
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tion provisions, and (2) a duty not to strike. 2 Chief Freight and
the NLRB argued, moreover, that injunctive relief was proper
even with the concomitant stay of arbitration. The company relied primarily on Southern Conference of Teamsters v. Red Ball
for its contention that arbitration of the
Motor Freight, Inc. ,13
dispute would cause a breach of its duty of neutrality toward
Local 886 and the Fifth Wheel until the question concerning representation had been decided by the NLRB. The NLRB, in contrast, argued that notions of comity required that arbitration be
stayed until it resolved the unfair labor practice charges and the
representational question, since its determination as to both
would be controlling.
As to the propriety of the stay itself and apart from the Boys
Markets issue, the Tenth Circuit rejected Chief Freight's contention that the possibility of a neutrality violation justified a stay
of the duty to arbitrate. It distinguished Red Ball because it did
not involve arbitration of a representational issue, nor did it involve an application for Boys Markets injunctive relief." The
court found the NLRB's comity argument equally unpersuasive,
relying largely on Carey v. Westinghouse Electric Corp." While
the possibility of conflict between an arbitrator's award and the
NLRB determination existed, the Tenth Circuit construed Carey
to hold that such a possible conflict could not "bar a § 301 suit
to compel arbitration of the representation issue if mandated
under the collective bargaining contract.""
514 F.2d at 580.
374 F.2d 932 (5th Cir. 1967).
" The specific issue in Red Ball was whether a particular collective bargaining agreement survived as a matter of law the merger of two employee units, each represented by
different local organizations. The Fifth Circuit held that the agreement whose arbitration
clause was sought to be enforced was suspended upon the merger, because neither labor
organization, after the merger, was the exclusive bargaining representative of the combined employee group. As a consequence, the court held that compelling arbitration would
require the employer to bargain with a union which was not the bargaining representative
of its employees and, thus, to cause a violation of section 8(a)(5) of the Act, 29 U.S.C. §
158(a) (1970). Unlike the Tenth Circuit in Chief Freight Lines, the Fifth Circuit felt,
"[tihere is positively no doubt that there exists a very real question with respect to
representation." 374 F.2d at 938. Compare United States Gypsum Co. v. United
Steelworkers, 384 F.2d 38 (5th Cir. 1967). The Tenth Circuit in Chief Freight Lines
indicated strongly that it did not believe a question concerning representation existed. 514
F.2d at 581 n.11.
375 U.S. 261 (1964).
514 F.2d at 582.
"

13
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While the Chief FreightLines court clearly indicated that it
did not believe a stay was required under the facts presented, it
specifically held that a Boys Markets injunction could not issue
if accompanied by a stay:
We are convinced that an injunction enforcing a no-strike provision but staying arbitration is improper under Boys Markets. While
the Court in Boys Markets was able to accommodate § 4 of the
Norris-LaGuardia Act, 29 USCA § 104, with § 301 of the NLRA to
allow an employer to enjoin a union strike in violation of a no-strike
clause, the Court emphasized that its holding was narrow. . . . It
premised such an injunction on its necessity to enforce the mandatory arbitration provision that had been bargained for between the
employer and the union. Since, as the Court stated, a no-strike
clause is the employer's quid pro quo for undertaking the obligation
to arbitrate, the Court felt that the employer was entitled to an
expeditious procedure for enforcing the union's promise not to
strike. The Court pointed to the illogic of "the unavailability of
equitable relief in the arbitration context. . . ." However, before
any injunction may issue, the district court must hold that the dispute is over a grievance that both parties are contractually bound
to arbitrate. And the principles adopted include the proviso that
"the employer should be ordered to arbitrate, as a condition of his
obtaining an injunction against the strike ..
Even assuming that continued arbitration would be a violation
of [neutrality] . . . we cannot accept Chief's stay argument that
this is sufficient justification to serve as another exception to the
Norris-LaGuardia policy. Neither the neutrality point nor the comity consideration demonstrate, as did Boys Markets, that there is
another statutory policy whose full execution necessarily calls for
relief such as the stay and an injunction against striking. 7

Thus, the Tenth Circuit recognized that Boys Markets was calculated to further the policy of peaceful resolution of disputes
through the arbitral process and that, where such resolution could
not be achieved through the arbitral process, Boys Markets relief
was inappropriate. The court further recognized that any extension of Boys Markets would necessarily rest upon the same kind
of policy "accommodation" which underlay the Supreme Court's
decision. Most significant, the Tenth Circuit recognized that the
Boys Markets "accommodation" arose from the quid pro quo
relationship between the employer's promise to arbitrate and the
union's promise not to strike, and that such "accommodation"
"

Id. at 580-82. (citations and footnotes omitted).
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would not be served by enforcing the no-strike clause without
enforcing the arbitration provision. There was, therefore, a careful attempt on the part of the Tenth Circuit to adhere to the
fundamental purpose of Boys Markets: The preservation of the
integrity of the arbitral process.
CONCLUSION

There is presently a significant dispute between several circuit courts of appeals as to the "narrowness" of Boys Markets.
Specifically, this dispute has crystallized the issue of whether
injunctive relief may be obtained in instances wherein members
of a bargaining unit, which is governed by a collective bargaining
agreement with mandatory grievance or arbitration procedures
and an express or implied no-strike pledge and which has no
underlying dispute with its own employer, may honor the picket
line of another local or labor organization." The court in Chief
Freight Lines approached this factual situation but, because of
the unique facts and contractual language, did not squarely confront the issue of sympathetic strikes and Boys Markets relief.
Clearly, in Chief Freight Lines the arbitral process would have
resolved the underlying dispute. Nonetheless, the Tenth Circuit's
reasoning indicates that in its view the Boys Markets holding is
a narrow one, limited to those instances in which the arbitral
process can expeditiously settle the dispute. However, regardless
of which direction the Tenth Circuit will take if confronted with
" The Second, Fifth, and Sixth Circuits have held that injunctive relief is not available in sympathetic strike situations since there is no "underlying dispute" resolvable
through the grievance or arbitration provisions. Plain Dealer Publishing Co. v. Cleveland
Typographical Local 53, 520 F.2d 1220 (6th Cir. 1975); Buffalo Forge Co. v. United
Steelworkers, 517 F.2d 1207 (2d Cir. 1975), cert. granted, 96 S. Ct. 214 (1975); Amstar
Corp. v. Amalgamated Meat Cutters, 468 F.2d 1372 (5th Cir. 1972). The Seventh Circuit
has recently swung towards the Second, Fifth, and Sixth Circuits in Hyster Co. v. Independent Towing & Lifting Mach. Ass'n., 519 F.2d 89 (7th Cir. 1975). Compare Gary
Hobart Water Corp. v. NLRB, 511 F.2d 284 (7th Cir. 1975), with Inland Steel Co. v. UMW
Local 1545, 505 F.2d 293 (7th Cir. 1974). The Third, Fourth, and Eighth Circuits have,
under similar circumstances, found injunctive relief available in sympathetic strike situations. Associated Gen. Contractors v. Construction Laborers Local 563, 519 F.2d 269 (8th
Cir. 1975); Valmac Indus., Inc. v. Amalgamated Meat Cutters Local 425, 519 F.2d 263 (8th
Cir. 1975); Island Creek Coal Co. v. UMW, 507 F.2d 650 (3d Cir. 1975); Armco Steel Corp.
v. UMW, 505 F.2d 1129 (4th Cir. 1974); NAPA Pittsburg, Inc. v. Automobile Chauffeurs
Local 926, 502 F.2d 321 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1049 (1974); Pilot Freight Carriers,
Inc. v. Teamsters Union, 497 F.2d 311 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 869 (1974);
Monongahela Power Co. v. IBEW Local 2332, 484 F.2d 1209 (4th Cir. 1973); Wilmington
Shipping Co. v. Longshoremen Local 1426, 86 LRRM 2846 (4th Cir. 1974).
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the litmus test of a sympathetic strike, the Chief Freight Lines
decision constitutes a recognition that Boys Markets relief is intended not simply as a means of specifically enforcing a no-strike
obligation, but as a method of furthering the present federal policy favoring arbitration and peaceful resolution of disputes. The
issuance of a stay, while simultaneously enjoining work stoppages
or the threat thereof, does not comport with the "narrow" holding
of Boys Markets, and in Chief Freight Lines the Tenth Circuit so
held.

